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Introduction
The fight against international terrorism has led many countries, including Germany
and the United States, to implement new criminal statutes that grant law enforcement officials
additional powers to observe and investigate criminal suspects. Notably, the U.S.A.
P.A.T.R.I.O.T. Act of 2001 and Germany’s Second Anti-Terrorism Package of 2002 both
sought to remove bureaucratic red tape, to increase collection of personal data at the border,
and to improve the exchange of information between security agencies.1 These laws have
given rise to new privacy concerns in both countries, especially in light of the development of
new investigative technologies and increasingly intrusive government surveillance methods.2
U.S. and German courts alike long have struggled to find the proper balance between
protecting the privacy rights of criminal suspects and granting law enforcement officials the
adequate technical tools to fight crime.3 The highest courts in each country have produced
different paradigms for determining where the public sphere ends and the private sphere
begins in cases involving technical surveillance. In the United States, the right to privacy is a
negative right. Individuals have the right to be free from illegal government searches and
seizures, but the government has no constitutional duty to preserve or cultivate an individual’s
private sphere. Against this backdrop, the U.S. Supreme Court has inquired simply whether a
criminal suspect’s reasonable expectation of privacy has been violated in cases involving state
use of technical surveillance measures. In contrast, privacy is a positive right in Germany.
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1 See Shawn Boyne, “The Future of Liberal Democracies in a Time of Terror: A Comparison of the Impact On Civil Liberties in the Federal
Republic of Germany and the United States,” 11 Tulsa J. Comp. & Int'l L. 111, 119, 126 (2003) (discussing measures implemented in the
United States in 2001 and in Germany in 2002 to improve information-gathering by intelligence agencies).
2 See Boyne, supra note 1, at 128.
2Accordingly, Germany’s Bundesverfassungsgericht [Federal Constitutional Court] has
constructed an affirmative obligation on the part of the state to create the conditions that foster
and uphold the private sphere. In analyzing state use of technical surveillance methods, the
Federal Constitutional Court has examined the effect of such surveillance on a suspect’s
human dignity and whether a surveillance technique inhibits the free development of
personality.
Despite these differences in approach, the countries’ highest courts more often than
not have reached similar conclusions. Part I of this Article traces modern U.S. privacy
jurisprudence as it has evolved under the Fourth Amendment in light of new developments in
surveillance technologies. It describes the shift from a privacy paradigm based on principles
of trespass to one that instead focuses on reasonable expectations of privacy. Part II evaluates
the roots of Germany’s human dignity principle in the privacy context and evaluates four very
recent privacy decisions involving the use of sophisticated surveillance techniques in
government investigations. Part III compares the U.S. and German approaches.
Despite their contrasting judicial philosophies, German and U.S. courts both have
recognized the home as the most highly protected realm in their respective societies. In both
countries, the state may use technical surveillance measures in a private home only in the
most limited of circumstances. Notwithstanding this similarity, the article concludes that
German jurisprudence is better prepared to protect the privacy rights of criminal defendants in
the 21st century. By linking privacy to human dignity, the German Federal Constitutional
Court has assured that privacy lines are not redrawn simply because investigative
technologies get more sophisticated or law enforcement priorities shift.
3 See Boyne, supra note 1, at 147-152.
3I. The United States
A. The Constitutional Framework
i. Background
The United States Constitution makes no explicit mention of the right to privacy.
Nonetheless, U.S. courts over the years have recognized a constitutional right to privacy.
This protection has not been all encompassing. Rather, it has targeted specific circumstances,
which have been expanded over time to include privacy in marriage, reproduction, birth
control, family relationships, child rearing and education.4
The most direct expression of the right to privacy can be found in the U.S
Constitution’s Fourth Amendment. 5 The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.6
The purpose of the amendment was to protect people from arbitrary government intrusion into
their liberty, privacy, and possessory interests. The Fourth Amendment encompasses two
main ideas. First, a government search or seizure must be “reasonable.” Second, before
embarking on a search or seizure, government actors should obtain warrants whenever
possible, and warrants should be based on the principle of “probable cause.” Because the
Fourth Amendment applies only to “searches” and “seizures,” an investigative method that
falls within neither category need not be reasonable and may be employed without a warrant
and without probable case, regardless of the circumstances surrounding its use. Therefore, in
determining whether the Fourth Amendment has been violated, courts traditionally have
looked first to whether a search or seizure actually has taken place. Only after concluding that
4 See Gebhard Rehm, “Just Judicial Activism? Privacy and Informational Self-Determination in U.S. and German Constitutional Law,” 32 U.
West. L.A. L. Rev. 275, 303 (2001).
5 See James Q. Whitman, “The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty,” 113 Yale L.J. 1151, 1212 (2004) (noting that
“privacy” begins with the Fourth Amendment).
6 U.S. Const., Fourth Amendment.
4a search or seizure has occurred will courts consider whether the search or seizure was
reasonable and/or required a warrant.
A search that is conducted with consent is not unconstitutional under the Fourth
Amendment.7 Similarly, an unconstitutional search has not taken place where police
investigators make observations in a public space, such as a street,8 a bar,9 or a sports
stadium.10 Only in particularly intimate areas within a public space, such as a locked
bathroom stall in an otherwise public building, are the police required to obtain a search
warrant.11 The consequence of an illegal search is that the evidence obtained cannot be used
against the criminal defendant who was the subject of the search in a court proceeding.12
ii. Exceptions for Emergencies and Exigent Circumstances
U.S. courts have recognized important limits and exceptions to the Fourth Amendment
when the police are conducting searches in emergency situations or under exigent
circumstances. Under exigent or emergency circumstances that require immediate aid law
enforcement officials may search a private home or property or person without a search
warrant.13 In the aftermath of the warrantless search a court will consider whether a
reasonable police officer under the same circumstances would have determined that
emergency circumstances were present.14
7 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (citing Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 593-594, 66 S. Ct. 1256, 90 L. Ed. 2d
1453 (1946)); Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 6307 (1946), rev'd, 330 U.S. 800 (1947).
8 Rodriguez v. United States, 878 F. Supp. 20, 24 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); People v. Warren, 199 Cal. Rptr. 864, 867 (Ct. App. 1984); People v.
Carlson, 677 P.2d 310, 316 (Colo. 1984).
9 Id. See also Gordon v. State, 640 S.W.2d 743, 753 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982); Pellatz v. State, 711 P.2d 1138, 1141 (Wyo. 1986).
10 Weber v. City of Cedarburg, 384 N.W.2d 333, 339 (Wis. 1986).
11 People v. Kalchik, 407 N.W.2d 627, 631 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (camera installed by police in ceiling of public restroom in mall videotaped
individuals engaging in homosexual activities); People v. Dezek, 308 N.W.2d 652, 654 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (police installed needle-point
video camera lens in ceiling above toilet stalls).
12 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, (1961) (applying rule to state courts); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-94 (1914) (applying rule to
federal courts).
13 See Matthew Bender, Criminal Constitutional Law § 3.02 (2004).
14 See Hopkins v. City of Sierra Vista, Ariz., 931 F.2d 524 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Lindsey, 877 F.2d 777, 781-82 (9th Cir. 1988);
United States v. Socey, 846 F.2d 1439, 1446 (D.C. Cir. 1988); United States v. Rivera, 825 F.2d 152, 156 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
979 (1987).
5A search conducted without a warrant can be justified where a person’s life is
endangered, a risk of serious bodily harm exists, 15 or private property16 must be protected.
Similarly, investigators may conduct an immediate search of an area (including rooms in a
residential dwelling) when they arrive at the scene of a murder17 or burglary18 to ensure that no
additional victims exist and to determine whether the suspect remains in the area.
Additionally, investigators may conduct a search without a warrant where a substantial risk
exists that evidence will be lost, removed or destroyed before a search warrant can be
obtained.19 However, investigators must believe with reasonable certainty that the evidence
in question is located on the property they are searching and that an imminent threat exists
that it will be destroyed, removed or lost. 20
Police officers must obtain a search warrant as soon as the exigent or emergency
circumstances that justified the warrantless search have passed.21 Prosecutors have the burden
to prove in the aftermath that police investigators genuinely faced exigent circumstances or an
emergency situation. 22 However, even exigent circumstances will not justify a warrantless
search in cases where the search involved only a minor offense.23
Finally, investigators may search a private residence without a warrant under the “hot
pursuit" doctrine.24 Under this doctrine, police officers may search an area without a warrant
when they are in "hot pursuit" of a suspect they want to arrest. A pursuit qualifies as "hot"
when the suspect immediately or directly fled from the crime of a scene or attempted arrest. 25
15 Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978), quoting Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (opinion of Burger, J.).
16 Reardon v. Wroan, 811 F.2d 1025, 1029-30 (7th Cir. 1987); State v. Myers, 601 P.2d 239, 244 (Alaska 1979); People v. Duncan, 720 P.2d
2, 5 (Cal. 1986).
17 Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (opinion of Burger, J.).
18 Reardon v. Wroan, 811 F.2d 1025, 1030 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Dart, 747 F.2d 263, 267 (4th Cir. 1984); People v. Duncan, 720
P.2d 2, 5 (Cal. 1986); People v. Bradley, 183 Cal. Rptr. 434, 437 (Ct. App. 1982); State v. Metz, 422 N.W.2d 754, 757 (Minn. Ct. App.
1988).
19 United States v. Sangineto-Miranda, 859 F.2d 1501, 1511 (6th Cir. 1988); United States v. Clement, 854 F.2d 1116, 1119 (8th Cir. 1988);
United States v. Socey, 846 F.2d 1439, 1444 (D.C. Cir. 1988); United States v. Napue, 834 F.2d 1311, 1326 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Rivera, 825 F.2d 152, 156 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 979 (1987); United States v. Moore, 790 F.2d 13, 15 (1st Cir. 1985).
20 United States v. Wilson, 865 F.2d 215, 216 (10th Cir. 1989); United States v. Sangineto-Miranda, 859 F.2d 1501, 1511 (6th Cir. 1988);
United States v. Clement, 854 F.2d 1116, 1119 (8th Cir. 1988); United States v. Socey, 846 F.2d 1439, 1444 n.5, 1445 (D.C. Cir. 1988);
United States v. Aquino, 836 F.2d 1268, 1272 (10th Cir. 1988).
21 437 U.S. at 393; United States v. Forker, 928 F.2d 365, 368 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v. Grisset, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 500 U.S. 945 (1991); People v. Krueger, 567 N.E.2d 717 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1293 (1992).
22 Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750 (1984).
23 See Bender, supra note 13, at § 3.02.
24 U.S. v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42 (1976); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298 (1967). See also Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100
(1990).
25 466 U.S. 740 (1984).
6B. The Fourth Amendment and the Use of Technical Surveillance Measures
i. The Trespass Doctrine
For much of the 20th century, the legal concept of privacy was closely linked to the
protection of property interests.26 Under this logic, a search occurred when government actors
trespassed on private property. As a result, under the jurisprudence prior to the 1960s,
warrants were necessary only in cases in which the courts found that the government had
interfered with the possessory interests of individuals.
The 1928 case, Olmstead v. U.S., provides an example of how this analysis was
applied to police use of wiretaps to intercept private telephone conversations.27 In ruling that
no search (and therefore no constitutional violation) had occurred, the Court emphasized that
neither the “defendant's person,” nor “his papers or his tangible material effects” had been
searched, nor had “an actual physical invasion of his house” taken place.28 Rather, the phones
were tapped “without trespass upon any property of the defendants”29 and the law enforcement
officials intercepting the telephone calls “were not in the house of either party to the
conversation.”30 Accordingly, the Court concluded that the tapped wires were not part of the
defendant's home or office “any more than […] the highways along which they [were]
stretched."31 Therefore, the wiretapping did not amount to a search or seizure within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.32
The Court came to the same conclusion in a 1942 case addressing the use of a
detectaphone, or listening device, by federal agents to eavesdrop on conversations taking
place in the defendant’s office.33 In Goldman v. U.S., the Court rejected arguments that
26 See Ric Simmons, “From Katz to Kyllo: A Blueprint for Adapting the Fourth Amendment to Twenty-First Century Technologies,” 53
Hastings L.J. 1303, 1307 (2002).
27 Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
28 Id. at 466.
29 Id. at 457.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 465.
32 Id. at 466.
33 Goldman v. U.S., 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
7attempted to distinguish between the taping of a live conversation occurring within the
confines of four walls and a telephone conversation that involved the transmission of voices
over wires outside of a building.34 The Court concluded that “no reasonable or logical
distinction” could be drawn between a listening device and a wiretap, and that the use of the
detectaphone by Government agents was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment.35
The Court sharpened its analysis in 1961, distinguishing between a listening device
placed on an outside adjoining wall, such as the detectaphone in Goldman, and a microphone
that actually penetrated a wall considered to be the defendants’ property.36 In Silverman v.
U.S., the Court found that the use of the so-called “spike mike” constituted an illegal trespass
because, unlike the detectaphone in Olmstead, it physically intruded into the defendants’
premises.37 The Court noted that “the officers overheard the petitioners' conversations only
by usurping part of the petitioners' house or office […], a usurpation that was effected without
their knowledge and without their consent.”38 Accordingly, the Court held that the
defendants’ Fourth Amendment rights had been violated.39
ii. The Birth of Reasonable Expectations: U.S. v. Katz
In the landmark 1967 case, United States v. Katz,40 the Supreme Court overturned its
prior reasoning, marking a major shift in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. In Katz, the
Court outright rejected the property-based trespass doctrine and moved toward a more
qualitative framework that evaluated an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy.41
In Katz, agents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had attached an
electronic listening and recording device to the outside of a public phone booth from which
34 Id. at 135.
35 Id.
36 365 U.S. 505, 510-511.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 511.
39 Id. at 511-512.
40 Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
41 Id. at 353.
8the defendant placed phone calls.42 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had rejected
arguments that the collection of the recordings violated the Fourth Amendment.43 Citing
Olmstead and Goldman, the Ninth Circuit noted that “no physical entrance into an area
occupied by the [defendant]” had occurred.44 The Supreme Court reversed, declaring that
“the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.”45 In explaining its ruling, the Court
noted that a person who enters a phone booth and shuts the door behind him assumes his
conversation will not be broadcast to the world.46 The fact that the caller could be seen
through the glass of the booth was not relevant to the Fourth Amendment inquiry, when “what
[the caller] sought to exclude... was not the intruding eye – [but] the uninvited ear.”47
Accordingly, the Court ruled that an illegal search had taken place, emphasizing that “what a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of
Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”48
In his concurring opinion, Justice Harlan formulated a highly influential two-part test
for determining whether an invasion of privacy violated the Fourth Amendment.49 First, a
person must exhibit an actual or subjective expectation of privacy, and, second, the
expectation must be one that society recognizes as “reasonable.” 50 This test was
subsequently adopted by a majority of the Court and provided the foundation for Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence for the remainder of the Twentieth Century.
In the same year as Katz the Supreme Court decided a second case, which
demonstrated the Court’s increasing concerns about the invasiveness of new technical
investigatory methods. In Berger v. New York, the Court struck down several provisions of a
42 Id. at 348.
43 Katz v. U.S., 369 F.2d 130 (9th Cir. 1966).
44 389 U.S. at 348-49.
45 Id. at 351.
46 Id. at 352.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 351.
49 Id. at 361.
50 Id. at 361.
9New York statute as unconstitutional because it allowed wiretapping without adequate legal
safeguards.51 First, the statute authorized eavesdropping without requiring a foundation for
the presumption that any particular offense had been or was being committed.52 Second, the
statute did not require that police investigators provide a “precise and discriminate”
description of the conversations to be wiretapped.53 Third, the statute did not require that
police end the acoustic surveillance as soon as they obtained the information sought by their
investigation.54 Fourth, the Court viewed as unconstitutional the fact that investigators could
wiretap a suspect’s phone for a period of two months without a fixed termination date and
could obtain an extension without a showing of probable cause.55 Finally, the law did not
require that the suspect be notified of the surveillance even when no exigent circumstances
were present.56
Although Berger was decided a few months prior to Katz, the Berger decision made
plain that the Supreme Court had reservations regarding the development of new investigative
technologies. The Court noted that the law had not kept pace with advances in scientific
knowledge57 and recognized that wiretapping by its very nature represented a broad invasion
of privacy.58 The legislature agreed. In response to the Court’s decisions in Katz and Berger,
Congress passed a law to ensure that wiretapping could be used by the state only in limited
circumstances.
The Wiretap Statute of 1968 limited the crimes and circumstances under which the
state could wiretap conversations and established strict compensation measures for private
persons who were illegally wiretapped by other private citizens.59 The requirements of the
Wiretap Statute were stricter than those set forth by the Supreme Court in Berger. 60 The law
51 388 U.S. 41.
52 Id. at 56.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 59.
55 Id. at 59.
56 Id. at 60.
57
“The law, though jealous of individual privacy, has not kept pace with these advances in scientific knowledge.” Id. at 49.
58
“By its very nature eavesdropping involves an intrusion on privacy that is broad in scope.” Id. at 56.
59 Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197, 211 (1968) (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (1994)).
60 See Robert A. Pikowsky, “An Overview of the Law of Electronic Surveillance Post September 11, 2001,” 94 Law Libr. J. 601, 604 (2002).
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prohibited the willful eavesdropping of wire, electronic or oral communications.61 Only
certain officials, such as the Attorney General, could request a search warrant from a judge in
order to wiretap telephone conversations and only in cases where specific serious crimes were
the focus of the investigation.62 A judge could only permit the wiretap where there was
probable cause that the suspect committed, or imminently would commit, one of the crimes
listed in the statute, and that specific conversations about the crime would be revealed during
the acoustic surveillance.63 In addition, other traditional investigatory measures had to have
been unsuccessful, less likely to be successful or too dangerous. The statute foresaw an
exception in emergency situations.64 Where an immediate risk of life or severe bodily injury
was present or where conspiratorial activities threatening the national security interest were
being investigated, prosecutors could begin the acoustic surveillance without a search warrant
so long as one was obtained within 48 hours of the start of the surveillance.65 In addition, the
Wiretap Statute reaffirmed the right of the Executive Branch to use appropriate measures in
situations where the national security of the United States was at risk.66
The Wiretap Statute has been updated numerous times over the years to accommodate
new developments in communications technology. In 1986 cell phones and other electronic
communications, such as email, were given the same protections as landline telephone calls
under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA).67 The Communications
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994 added cordless phones to the list of prohibited
communications, which the ECPA had overlooked. 68
iii. Privacy Protection and National Security after Katz
61 § 802, 82 Stat. at 213-14 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2000)).
62 § 802, 82 Stat. at 216-17 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (2000)).
63 See Wayne R. Lafave, Jerold H. Israel, & Nancy J. King, Criminal Procedure 333 (2d ed. 1999).
64 See Lafave, Israel, et. al, supra note 63, at 333.
65 18 U.S.C. § 2518(7).
66 Nothing in the statute should be seen as limiting “the constitutional power of the President to take such measures as he deems necessary to
protect the United States against the overthrow of the Government by force or other unlawful means, or against any other clear and present
danger to the structure or existence of the Government." Id. at 2511(3).
67 See Pikowsky, supra note 60, at 605.
68 See Pikowsky, supra note 60, at 605.
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In Katz, the Supreme Court emphasized that its decision did not address situations in
which the national security of the United States was at risk.69 This was the focus of the 1972
Keith case, in which the Court had to determine whether the use of wiretaps without a search
warrant was constitutional in situations involving national security. In the Keith case three
members of a domestic extremist group were accused of conspiring to plant explosives at the
headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Prosecutors had wiretapped the
suspects without a search warrant.
Prosecutors argued that they had the right to wiretap conversations in two types of
situations involving national security: in cases involving domestic subversion and foreign
intelligence operations.70 They argued that this right was a reasonable extension of executive
power, which allowed the president to take appropriate steps to ensure the national security of
the United States.71
In a unanimous decision the Supreme Court ruled that a search warrant was
constitutionally required in cases involving domestic subversion.72 The circumstances at hand
were not sufficient to justify an exception to Fourth Amendment requirements.73 The Court
emphasized that the use of wiretaps was particularly sensitive where domestic subversion was
involved because the gathering of intelligence was by nature “necessarily broad and
continuing” and the temptation to use such a surveillance to oversee political dissent would be
difficult to resist.74
The Keith decision left open the question of whether a search warrant was
constitutionally required in cases where the Executive Branch asked prosecutors to wiretap
so-called “foreign powers” within the United States.75 In order to fill this gap, the U.S.
69 389 U.S. at 359.
70 U.S. v. U.S. District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
71 Id. at 318-319. The President of the United States has the constitutional duty to "preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United
States." U.S. Const. art. II, 1, cl. 7.
72 Id. at 320.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 321-322.
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Congress passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) in 1978.76 The statute
established a special court with exclusive jurisdiction over cases in which the state wanted to
wiretap foreign powers within the United States in order to investigate foreign intelligence
operations. Under the statute the term “foreign powers” refers not only to foreign states, but
also to international terrorists and members of foreign political organizations.77 In order to
wiretap foreign powers within the United States, prosecutors had to demonstrate that the
primary goal of the surveillance was the collection of intelligence and that there was probable
cause that the suspect was a foreign power or agent of a foreign power.78 Investigators had to
fulfill specific conditions to ensure that U.S. persons79 were not impacted too severely by the
surveillance.80 In emergency situations investigators were permitted to begin the surveillance
without a search warrant, however, they had to obtain a warrant within 72 hours.81 The
Executive Branch could also, under limited circumstances, wiretap conversations between
foreign powers.82 However, this exception applied only where foreign powers or their agents
were the focus of the surveillance and no substantial likelihood existed that a U.S. person
would be the subject of surveillance.83
After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York, Congress amended FISA
by passing the U.S.A. P.A.T.R.I.O.T. Act (Patriot Act).84 The Patriot Act broadened the range
of tools federal investigators could use to surveil foreign powers to include “roving” wiretaps
and the surveillance of email.85 The statute was also more permissible regarding the use of
pen registers and trap-and-trace devices, which allow investigators to see which numbers have
76 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. 1801-1811, 1821-
1829, 1841-1846 (1994 & Supp. II 1996 & Supp. III 1997)).
77 See 50 U.S.C. 1801 (a)-(c).
78 See 50 U.S.C. 1805 (a) (3).
79 A "United States person" is defined as "a citizen of the United States [or] an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence." See 50
U.S.C. 1801 (i).
80 See 50 U.S.C. 1801 (h) (1-4) (requiring “minimization” procedures in FISA).
81 See 50 U.S.C. 1805 (f) (1-2).
82 See 50 U.S.C. 1802 (a).
83 See 50 U.S.C. 1802 (a).
84 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA
PATRIOT Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
85 USA PATRIOT Act 206.
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been dialed or received on a specific phone.86 In addition, the statute made less strict the
requirement that foreign intelligence gathering must be the "primary" goal of the surveillance.
Under the Patriot Act the gathering of foreign intelligence must only be a "significant" goal of
the surveillance.87
C. Beyond Wiretaps: Katz and the Evolution of New Surveillance Measures
Katz marked a new direction for the Court. Having decoupled the link between Fourth
Amendment privacy and common law notions of trespass, the Court created a novel lens
through which to view expectations of privacy. However, Katz left open the question of
precisely what privacy expectations were “reasonable” in an age of modern criminal
surveillance. This was an issue the Court repeatedly confronted in the latter part of the
twentieth century in cases involving pen registers, aerial surveillance and mapping tools, radio
transmitters, and sense-enhancing technology.
i. Pen Registers (1979)
In one of its most important decisions after Katz, the Supreme Court had to decide in
Smith v. Maryland whether police use of pen registers without a search warrant was
constitutionally permissible under the Fourth Amendment.88 A pen register is a technical
device that allows investigators to monitor the numbers dialed from a specific phone.89 In
Smith, a pen register was put in place after a victim of a burglary received harassing calls
from the man suspected of committing the burglary. 90 The suspect argued that the use of the
pen register violated his Fourth Amendment rights.91
86 USA PATRIOT Act 216.
87 USA PATRIOT Act 218.
88 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
89 Id. at 736 n.1.
90 Id. at 737.
91 Id.
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The Supreme Court rejected this argument.92 Essential to the Court’s finding was the
fact that only the phone numbers dialed, not the contents of his conversations, were
monitored.93 Applying Katz, the Court analyzed whether the suspect in the case had a
reasonable expectation of privacy that the numbers dialed on his home phone would not
become public.94 The Court found that pen registers were readily distinguishable from the
wiretap in Katz because they could not reveal the content of conversations. 95 The Court
expressed doubt that a reasonable person would expect that phone numbers dialed from his
home phone would remain private because the telephone company issued a monthly bill
listing all numbers dialed from a particular phone.96 In addition, it was impossible for a
person to dial a phone number without the telephone company knowing about it.97
Moreover, the Supreme Court found it inconsequential that that the telephone calls in
question were made from the suspect’s home.98 The location from which the suspect placed
the phone calls might be relevant in a case where investigators monitored the contents of a
phone conversation, but not in the present case in which only the numbers dialed were
seized.99 Accordingly, the Court ruled that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in
the numbers dialed from one’s home phone.100
ii. Radio Transmitters (1983-1984)
In U.S. v Knots, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the use of a battery-
operated radio transmitter, or beeper, to trace the movements of a criminal defendant
constituted an unlawful search under the Fourth Amendment.101 In Knots, police officers
92 Id. at 740-41.
93 Id. at 741.
94 Id. at 740.
95 Id. at 741.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 743.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
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planted a beeper on a container of chloroform that was subsequently sold to the defendant.102
The chemical company that retailed the chloroform had granted permission for the beeper’s
placement. 103 With the aid of the device, which emits periodic signals that can be picked up
by a radio receiver, the police were able to monitor the movements of the defendant in his car
after he placed the can of chloroform inside.104 Police followed the defendant home, after
which the beeper was no longer used.105
In finding that the use of the radio transmitter did not constitute a search under the
Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court noted that “a person traveling in an automobile on
public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one
place to another.”106 Also dispositive was the police’s limited use of the signals from the
beeper.107 Although the beeper enabled officers’ to find the defendant’s home when their own
visual observations failed them because they lost sight of defendant’s car on the highway, the
Court found that the use of visual surveillance and a radio transmitter in this context were
qualitatively the same.108 The Court explained that “[n]othing in the Fourth Amendment
prohibited the police from augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with
such enhancement as science and technology afforded them in this case.”109
In U.S. v. Karo, the issue of radio transmitters in police work was once again brought
before the Supreme Court.110 Here, the Court addressed the question of whether police use of
a beeper to monitor defendants’ movements constituted a search under the Fourth
Amendment when it revealed information not obtainable through visual surveillance.111 Like
police officers in Knotts, officials in Karo used a beeper on a chemical can to follow the
102 Id. at 278.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 278-279.
106 Id. at 281.
107 Id. at 284.
108 Id. at 282.
109 Id.
110 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
111 Id. at 707.
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defendant home.112 However, in Karo, the officers also used the beeper’s signals to trace the
container’s location within the defendant’s residence, as well as a co-conspirator’s residence,
and eventually a commercial storage facility.113 At no time had the officers been able to rely
on visual surveillance to track the container as it moved between these locations.114
The Court rejected arguments that the mere transfer of a can containing a beeper to the
defendant implicated any privacy interests.115 Rather, the Court found troublesome the use of
the beeper in a private residence, “a location not open to visual surveillance.”116 The Court
explained that “private residences are places in which the individual normally expects privacy
free of governmental intrusion not authorized by a warrant.”117 In finding that the use of the
beeper in a private abode constituted a search, the Court concluded that “indiscriminate
monitoring of property that has been withdrawn from public view would present far too
serious a threat to privacy interest in the home to escape entirely some sort of Fourth
Amendment oversight.”118
iii. Aerial Surveillance (1986-1989)
In a pair of companion cases in 1986, the Supreme Court for the first time addressed
the issue of whether aerial observations from high altitudes constituted a search within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. In both cases, one involving a fenced-in backyard and
the other an industrial complex, the court found that no search had taken place. In California
v. Ciraolo, police officers trained in marijuana identification flew a private airplane over the
defendant’s house at an altitude of 1,000 feet and identified marijuana plants growing in the
yard.119 The cannabis could be seen with the naked eye and police officers photographed the
112 Id. at 708.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 712.
116 Id. at 714.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 716.
119 476 U.S. 207, 209 (1986).
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plants with a standard 35mm camera.120 Applying Katz, the Court analyzed whether (1) the
defendant had manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged
search, and (2) society was willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable.121
The Court found that the defendant did not have a reasonable privacy expectation in
his backyard, despite the fact that he had taken measures to restrict the area from public view
by surrounding it with a ten-foot fence.122 The Court reasoned that that this barrier might
have created some sphere of privacy from “normal sidewalk traffic,” but it did not necessarily
entitle the defendant to “a subjective expectation of privacy from all observations of his
backyard.”123 Moreover, because any member of the flying public could have seen everything
that the officers observed from their plane, no reasonable expectation of privacy existed.124
The Court explained that the “Fourth Amendment protection of the home has never been
extended to require law enforcement officers to shield their eyes when passing by a home on
public thoroughfares.”125 Noting that private and commercial flight had become “routine,”
the Court concluded that the defendant’s expectation that the Fourth Amendment protect him
from naked-eye observations from an altitude of 1,000 feet was unreasonable.126
In the companion case, Dow Chemical v. U.S., the Court addressed the issue of
whether the use of a precision aerial mapping camera from an airplane flying in public air
space constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment.127 As part of a government
investigation, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had taken aerial photographs of a
2,000-acre industrial complex from altitudes of 12,000, 3,000, and 1,200 feet.128 In finding
that no illegal search had taken place, the Court emphasized the fact that the complex was
“not an area immediately adjacent to a private home, where privacy expectations are most
120 Id. at 209.
121 Id. at 211.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 212.
124 Id. at 213-214.
125 Id. at 213.
126 Id. at 215.
127 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
128 Id. at 229.
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heightened.”129 The Court found that “the intimate activities associated with family privacy
and the home and its curtilage simply do not reach the outdoor areas or spaces between
structures and buildings of a manufacturing plant.”130
The Court also considered the fact that the aerial mapping camera provided the EPA
with “more detailed information than naked-eye views.”131 However, because the details
observed remained limited to an outline of the facility's buildings and equipment, this factor
did not prove troubling to the Court.132 The Court reasoned that “the mere fact that human
vision is enhanced somewhat, at least to the degree here, does not give rise to constitutional
problems.”133 The Court conceded, however that “that surveillance of private property by
using highly sophisticated surveillance equipment not generally available to the public, such
as satellite technology, might be constitutionally proscribed absent a warrant.”134
Three years later, the Court again addressed the issue of aerial surveillance in Florida
v. Riley.135 In a case reminiscent of Ciraolo, the Court evaluated whether a police officer
making naked eye observations of a greenhouse located within the curtilage of a mobile home
from a helicopter at an altitude of 400-feet violated the Fourth Amendment by failing to
secure a warrant.136 A plurality found that no warrant was required even though the occupant
had a subjective expectation of privacy.137 Citing Ciraolo, the plurality noted that "private
and commercial flight [by helicopter] in the public airways is routine" and that the occupant
“could not reasonably have expected that his greenhouse was protected from public or official
observation from a helicopter had it been flying within the navigable airspace for fixed-wing
129 Id. at 237 n. 4.
130 Id. at 236.
131 Id. at 238.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
136 Id. at 447-448.
137 Id. at 449.
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aircraft.”138 In addition, because the surveillance revealed no intimate details, the plurality
found that no Fourth Amendment violation had occurred.139
iv. Sense-Enhancers (2001)
In Kyllo v. U.S., the Court addressed the issue of whether the warrantless use of sense-
enhancing technologies violated the Fourth Amendment.140 Specifically, the case presented
the question of whether the use of a thermal-imaging device aimed at a private residence from
a public street to detect relative amounts of heat within the home constituted a search.141
The Court held that it did.142
In Kyllo, police officers used a thermal imager to investigate whether the defendant
was cultivating marijuana in his home. Thermal-imaging devices detect the infrared radiation
that virtually all objects emit, but which are not visible to the naked eye.143 Because indoor
marijuana cannot generally be grown without the assistance of high-intensity lamps,
investigators used thermal-imaging technology to determine whether the amount of heat
emanating from the defendant’s residence was consistent with the use of these lamps.144
In its analysis, the Court emphasized the fact that police officers conducted “more than a
naked-eye surveillance of a home.”145 The Court noted that because investigators used the
sense-technology to obtain “information regarding the interior of the home that could not
otherwise have been obtained without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally protected
area,’” the act constituted a search.146 The Court distinguished Kyllo from Dow Chemical,
noting that the use of aerial photography in Dow Chemical did not constitute a search in part
138 Id. at 450-451.
139 Id. at 452.
140 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
141 Id. at 29.
142 Id. at 35, 40.
143 Id. at 29.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 33.
146 Id. at 34 (citing Silverman, 365 U.S. at 512).
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because the target of surveillance was an industrial complex, not a private residence.147 The
fact that the technology was “not in general use” was also a factor in the Court’s analysis.148
D. Summary
The Supreme Court after Katz has focused on three primary elements in order to answer
the question of whether a state actor has exceeded the limits of the Fourth Amendment in
cases involving new investigative technologies. First, what is the target of the surveillance?
It is plain that a person’s living quarters receive greater protection than a commercial
property. Second, what type of information is revealed in the surveillance? Where technical
surveillance reveals intimate or private details, it is more likely that someone’s Fourth
amendment privacy has been invaded. Third, what is the nature of the technical means used?
Investigative technologies that are broadly used and well known lead to a lower expectation
of privacy than those that are less well known or not generally available to the public.
147 Id. at 33.
148 Id. at 34.
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II. Germany
A. The Basic Law
i. The Applicable Basic Rights
Like the U.S. Constitution, Germany’s Grundgesetz [Basic Law or Constitution] does
not create a general right to privacy.149 Rather, privacy interests are protected primarily
through four constitutional provisions: the inviolability of human dignity under Article 1 of
the Basic Law,150 the right to personality under Article 2(1),151 the privacy of post and
telecommunications under Article 10,152 and the guarantee of the home’s inviolability under
Article 13.153
Articles 1 and 2(1) have been at the center of Germany’s privacy cases for the past
three decades. Article 1 of the Basic Law declares: “Human dignity shall be inviolable. To
respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority.”154 Under Article 1, the state has
an affirmative obligation to create the conditions that foster and uphold human dignity.155 A
person shall not be made into a "mere object" of the state. 156 The protection of human dignity
is the most important of all the Basic Rights,157 and Article 1 of the Basic Law cannot be
amended or removed.158 The drafters of Germany’s Basic Law, responding to the horrors of
National Socialism, hoped that the placement of human dignity at the center of Germany’s
constitutional order would act to prevent the replication of torture, humiliation, and other
149 Michael Sachs, Grundgesetz Kommentar, 3. Aufl., München 2003, Art. 10 Rn. 6; Walter Schmitt Glaeser, “Schutz der Privatsphäre,” in
Handbuch des Staatsrechts, Band VI (Hrsg. Josef Isensee und Paul Kirchhof) 2. Aufl., Heidelberg 2001, Rn. 2.
150 Grundgesetz [Basic Law] art. 1, para. 1-2.
151 Grundgesetz [Basic Law] art. 2, para. 1-2.
152
“Privacy of letters, posts, and telecommunications shall be inviolable. Restrictions may only be ordered pursuant to a statute. Where a
restriction serves to protect the free democratic basic order or the existence or security of the Federation, the statute may stipulate that the
person affected shall not be informed of such restriction and that recourse to the courts shall be replaced by a review of the case by bodies
and auxiliary bodies appointed by Parliament.” Grundgesetz [Constitution] art. 10, para. 1-2.
153
“The home is inviolable. Searches may be ordered only by a judge or, in the event of danger in delay, by other organs as provided by law
and may be carried out only in the form prescribed by law. Otherwise, this inviolability may be encroached upon or restricted only to avert a
common danger or a mortal danger to individuals, or, pursuant to a law, to prevent imminent danger to public security and order, especially
to alleviate the housing shortage, to combat the danger of epidemics or to protect endangered juveniles.” Grundgesetz [Basic Law] art. 13,
para. 1-3.
154 Grundgesetz [Basic Law] art. 1, para. 1.
155 James J. Killean, Der Große Lauschangriff: Germany Brings Home the War on Organized Crime, 23 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev 173,
186 (2000); Horst Dreier, Grundgesetz Kommentar, 2. Aufl., 2004, Art. 1 I Rn. 136ff; Hermann v. Mangoldt & Friedrich Klein, Kommentar
zum Grundgesetz, 5. Aufl., München 20005, Art. 1 I Rn. 40ff.
156 Mangoldt/Klein, Art. 1 I Rn. 17; Sachs, Art. 1 Rn. 13ff.
157 Dreier, Art. 1 I Rn. 40ff; Mangoldt/Klein, Art. 1 I Rn. 10.
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atrocities that had plagued Germany in the past. 159 Since its creation, the human dignity
clause has been invoked in a wide range of contexts, including cases involving life
imprisonment,160 abortion,161 and free expression.162
Article 1 is closely linked to Article 2’s personality clause. Articles 2(1) states that
“every person shall have the right to free development of his personality insofar as he does
not violate the rights of others or offend against the constitutional order or the moral law.”163
Paragraph 2 continues: “Every person shall have the right to life and physical integrity.
Freedom of the person shall be inviolable. These rights may be interfered with only pursuant
to a law.”164 Thus, the right to personality, unlike the human dignity clause, is not absolute,
and it does not impose upon the state an affirmative obligation to create the conditions
necessary for its realization.165 The Federal Constitutional Court has held that the personality
clause should be invoked only when intrusive state action is at stake.166
Article 2(1) has been interpreted as guaranteeing a general freedom of action and, in
conjunction with Article 1, as a general right to personality.167 The first part of Article 2(1)
protects the right to act or refrain from acting as one pleases.168 The latter part ensures a
general existential space in which an individual can freely develop his or her personality,
without consideration of societal expectations.169 The right to personality also includes a right
to „informational self-determination,“ which gives an individual the right to control when and
under what circumstances his personal data is made public or shared.170
158 Dreier, Art. 1 I Rn. 43; Mangoldt/Klein, Art. 1 I Rn. 1, 14.
159 See Ernst Benda, “Fifty Years of Basic Law, The New Departure for Germany,” 53 SMU L. Rev. 443, 445 (2000); Dreier, Art. 1 I Rn. 22,
39; Mangoldt/Klein, Art. 1 I Rn. 1. See also David P. Currie, The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany 11 (1994).
160 See Life Imprisonment Case, 45 BverfGE 187 (1977).
161 See Abortion I Case,39 BverfGE I (1975); Abortion II Case (1993), 8 BverfGE 203 (1993).
162 See Mephisto Case, 30 BverfGE 173 (1971).
163 Grundgesetz [Basic Law] art. 2, para. 1.
164 Grundgesetz [Basic Law] art. 2, para. 2.
165 See Killean, supra note 155, at 189.
166 Id.
167 Dreier, Art. 2 I Rn. 23; Mangoldt/Klein, Art. 2 I Rn. 8ff.
168 Dreier, Art. 2 I Rn. 23ff; Sachs, Art. 2 I Rn. 43ff.
169 Dreier, Art. 2 I Rn. 70; Mangoldt/Klein, Art. 2 I Rn. 85.
170 Dreier, Art. 2 I Rn. 78; Mangoldt/Klein, Art. 2 I Rn. 114ff; Currie, 320.
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Article 2(1) generally has been interpreted in light of Article 1.171 The prevalent view
among German constitutional scholars is that an individual must be given broad freedom to
develop his personality in order to protect his dignity.172 The sometimes controversial
“sphere theory” divides different aspects of life into categories requiring different levels of
constitutional privacy protection.173 The core sphere of privacy requires absolute protection
and may not be invaded because it is closely linked to human dignity, which is inviolable
under Article 1.174 The intimate sphere, which pertains to private activities that have little
social relevance, receives strong, but not absolute, protection.175 The more intense the social
relevance is the less likely the activity is to receive absolute privacy protection. 176 A state
invasion of the intimate sphere of privacy may occur when it is in the preponderant interest of
the common good and strict principles of proportionality are followed.177 The third level is
the social sphere. Here invasions of privacy are permitted under requirements listed in Art.
2(1)(2).178
Article 10 shields the confidentiality of certain communications. Specifically, it
protects the privacy of postal and telecommunications. Protected postal communications
include the contents of letters or other written correspondence.179 In addition, Article 10 gives
an individual control over how postal communications are stored, utilized or distributed.180
Protected telecommunications include traditional phone calls, as well as all other wired and
wireless communications, such as email or text messages.181 Although the once state-owned
German Telecom and German Postal Service have been privatized, these entities continue to
be bound to Article 10.182
171 Glaeser, Rn. 23; Mangoldt/Klein, Art. 2 I Rn. 57; Sachs, Art. 2 I Rn. 103.
172 Glaeser, Rn. 23; Sachs, Art. 2 I Rn. 106.
173 Glaeser, Rn. 34; Sachs, Art. 2 I Rn. 104.
174 Glaeser, Rn. 35; Mangoldt/Klein, Art. 2 I Rn. 88; Bernd Wölfl, “Sphärentheorie und Vorbehalt des Gesetzes,“ in NVwZ 2002 Heft 01
(50).
175 Glaeser, Rn. 36; Sachs, Art. 2 I Rn. 104.
176 Glaeser, Rn. 37; Wölfl, S. 51.
177 Glaeser, Rn. 37ff; Mangoldt/Klein, Art. 2 I Rn. 88; Sachs, Art. 2 I Rn. 103ff; Wölfl, S. 50.
178 Glaeser, Rn. 37; Bodo Pieroth & Bernhard Schlink, Grundrechte. Staatsrecht II, 21. Aufl., Heidelberg 2005, Rn. 382.
179 Pieroth/Schlink, Rn. 765; Mangoldt/Klein, Art. 10 Rn. 27.
180 Dreier, Art. 10 Rn. 16. Vgl. Mangoldt/Klein, Art. 10 Rn. 86ff.
181 Dreier, Art. 10 Rn. 19ff; Pieroth/Schlink, Rn. 773.
182 Dreier Art. 10 Rn. 22ff, 83ff; Pieroth/Schlink, Rn. 762f, 768, 772, 774.
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Article 13 protects the privacy of the home. This Basic Right aims to provide a
fundamental living space in which an individual has the right to be let alone.183 It preserves
the right of a resident to determine who can access his home, as well as when and under what
circumstances.184 Accordingly, the inviolability of the home does not apply when the resident
consents to a search or other invasion of his privacy at home.185
The concept of “home” or living quarters has been construed broadly to be understood
as any domain of privacy, so that workspaces such as offices and curtilages such as yards or
gardens are included. 186 However, Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court has given
workspaces such as offices a more limited level of privacy protection because of the strong
social ties associated with such environments. 187
Under Article 13(2), a home may only be searched if a search warrant is obtained. 188
Technical means may be used to surveil a home under Article 13(4) and (5) to avert acute
dangers to public safety, but a search warrant must be obtained in the aftermath of the
surveillance if it was not possible to obtain such an order in advance.189 At a minimum,
however, the surveillance measures must be ordered by other authorities designated by law.190
ii. State Curtailment of Basic Rights
According to Germany’s Basic Law the state may encroach on certain Basic Rights
under some circumstances. Whether a Basic Right can be limited or an encroachment of a
Basic Right can be justified depends in large part on whether a reservation or caveat for that
right has been expressed in the Basic Law. Additionally, a Basic Right may be limited by
another Basic Right, with whose principles it collides. There are three types of Basic Rights:
183 Dreier, Art. 13 Rn. 12; Pieroth/Schlink, Rn. 872.
184 Dreier, Art. 13 Rn. 12; Mangoldt/Klein, Art. 13 I Rn. 2.
185 Glaeser, Rn. 54; Sachs, Art. 13 Rn. 23.
186 Dreier Art 13 Rn. 12; Pieroth/Schlink, Rn. 872.
187 Glaeser, Rn. 50; Mangoldt/Klein, Art. 13 I Rn. 26, 62.
188 Glaeser, Rn. 59; Mangoldt/Klein, Art. 13 I Rn. 71, 75.
189 Mangoldt/Klein, Art. 13 I Rn. 134; Sachs, Art. 13 Rn 46.
190 Mangoldt/Klein, Art. 13 I Rn. 133; Pieroth/Schlink, Rn. 884.
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those with simple reservations, those with qualified reservations and those without
reservations.
A simple reservation states that a Basic Right may be encroached only by statute.191
Article 10(2)(1), which states that restrictions to the privacy of postal and telecommunications
"may be ordered only pursuant to a law," is an example of such a reservation. It is to be
distinguished from the second sentence in Article 10(2), which is viewed by German
constitutional scholars as an exception rather than a reservation. That sentence allows the
state to undertake exceptional measures to protect the Constitution and the state. 192
A qualified reservation requires not only a statute to limit a Basic Right, but mandates
that the law be based on specific circumstances, serve a specific purpose, or use specific
means.
193 Article 13 includes several qualified reservations.194 Article 13(2), for example,
permits searches as long as search warrant is obtained from a judge. Article 13(3) permits the
use of technical measures to surveil suspects where specific facts can support that a suspect
has committed a particularly severe crime. The use of technical measures is, however, limited
so that they are only permitted with judicial order and where other investigative means would
be particularly difficult or pointless. Article 13(4) and (5) permit acoustic surveillance for the
purpose of preventing immediate danger. Article 13 is also qualified by Article 17a(2), which
states that the inviolability of the home can be revoked by law in order to defend the country,
including to protect the civilian population. 195
If a Basic Right is not limited by an express or qualified reservation, then it may only
be limited by colliding Basic Rights of third parties.196 A conflict between two constitutional
rights or principles will generally be resolved by weighing the rights against one another with
the hope that a "practical concordance" will be reached.197 Article 1, which declares human
dignity inviolable, is an example of a Basic Right that has no reservation. Unlike other Basic
191 Dreier Vorb. Rn. 136; Pieroth/Schlink, Rn. 253; Sachs, Vor Art. 1 Rn. 115.
192 Dreier, Art. 10 Rn. 56ff; Mangoldt/Klein, Art. 10 Rn. 64.
193 Dreier Vorb. Rn. 136; Pieroth/Schlink, Rn. 255; Sachs, Rn. Vor Art. 1 Rn. 116.
194 Dreier, Art. 13 Rn. 29ff; Sachs, Art. 13 Rn. 25ff.
195 Dreier, Art. 13 Rn. 48; Mangoldt/Klein, Art. 17a Rn. 36ff; Sachs, Art. 17a Rn. 26.
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Rights, however, the inviolability of human dignity cannot be compromised or weighed
against another Basic Right.198 In addition, Article 1 is further strengthened because Article
79(3) prohibits its alteration or abolition.199
Similarly, Article 2(1) is an exception in this context. Article 2 is generally seen as a
Basic Right that includes a simple reservation because it requires that the right to personality
be preserved only in so far as it does not disturb the constitutional order.200 Notably, however,
encroachments on the right to personality that impact the core sphere of privacy are only
permissible where constitutional rights collide.201
iii. Justifying State Encroachments on Basic Rights
Reservations permit the legislature to encroach on Basic Rights where necessary.
However, legislators are subject to their own constitutional limitations in exercising this right.
These so-called Schranken-Schranken [or “limits on limits,” the restrictions that govern to
what extent Basic Rights may be restricted] arise from Articles 19 and 20 of the Basic Law.
Article 19 lists several conditions that must be met when legislators limit Basic Rights.
Under Article 19(1)(1), a statute that restricts a Basic Right must be a general and abstract
rule.202 Article 19(1) also requires that the legislature name the Basic Right in the law that
limits it.203 This Zitiergebot [“citation requirement”] aims to warn and inform the legislature
and the public at large that a Basic Right is being impacted.204 Finally, a Basic Right may in
no case be limited so that its essential content or character is defeated.205 This is known as the
Wesenhaltsgarantie [“guarantee of the essential”].
196 Dreier Vorb. Rn. 139ff, 158; Sachs, Vor Art. 1 Rn. 120.
197 Pieroth/Schlink, Rn. 321; Sachs, Vor Art. 1 Rn. 124.
198 Dreier, Art. 1 Rn. 44, 132ff; Mangoldt/Klein, Art. 1 I Rn. 61, Sachs Art. Rn. 6, 10ff.
199 Dreier, Art. 1 Rn. 43; Sachs , Art. 79 para. 3 Rn. 30ff.
200 Pieroth/Schlink, Rn. 383; Sachs, Art. 2 Rn. 90.
201 Glaeser, Rn. 37; Wölfl, S. 50.
202 Pieroth/Schlink, Rn. 307; Sachs, Art. 19 Rn. 20ff.
203 Pieroth/Schlink, Rn. 310; Sachs, Art. 19 Rn. 25ff.
204 Pieroth/Schlink, Rn. 310; Sachs, Art. 19 Rn. 26.
205 Mangoldt/Klein, Art. 19 Rn. 139; Sachs, Art. 19 Rn. 9.
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A law that restricts a Basic Right must follow the rule of law principles found in
Article 20. Accordingly, such a law must be proportional, specific and not retroactive. The
principle of proportionality requires that the statute limiting the Basic Right must have a
legitimate goal for whose accomplishment it is suited and necessary.206 A measure is
considered necessary when no other means by which the state could reasonably reach the
same result that would be less burdensome for the citizen.207 Under the specificity
requirement a citizen must be able to recognize what consequences his behavior could or will
have. 208 The state response to certain behaviors must be predictable to avoid arbitrariness. 209
The prohibition on retroactivity prohibits state action where a legal norm or process has been
so transformed that a past deed now has a different consequence than it once had.210
B. Privacy Rights and the Development of New Technologies
Throughout the second half of the 20th century the Federal Constitutional Court
repeatedly had to address to what extent the state could invade the privacy of individual
citizens and under what circumstances government encroachment on privacy could be
justified. In several cases, the Court’s decisions were in direct response to new developments
in technology that raised new questions regarding privacy. As a result, case law developed in
Germany that linked privacy protection to the inviolability of human dignity and the right to
freely develop one’s personality.
i. The Microcensus Case (1969)
In 1969 the Federal Constitutional Court had to address the question of whether the
federal government could collect personal information for a national census. Its decision in
the case was the first to link privacy rights, the right to personality, and the inviolability of
206 Dreier, Vorb. Rn. 145ff; Sachs, Art. 20 Rn. 149ff.
207 Dreier, Vorb. Rn. 148; Pieroth/Schlink, Rn. 285ff.
208 Pieroth/Schlink, Rn. 312; Sachs, Art. 20 Rn. 126.
209 Pieroth/Schlink, Rn. 312; Sachs, Art. 20 Rn. 126.
210 Pieroth/Schlink, Rn. 295a; Sachs, Art. 20 Rn.133.
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human dignity in relation to the use of new technologies. At that time the German federal
government was permitted by law to collect general personal data as part of a national
census. However, a 1960 amendment to the law required German citizens to provide
additional information about their vacations, including the length, destination, and means of
transportation used. 211 In the Microcensus Case a group of Bavarian citizens filed a suit after
they were fined DM100 (approx. $50) because they refused to provide this information to
federal data collectors. The claimants alleged that the questionnaire violated their privacy
rights under Article 1. 212
The Federal Ministry of the Interior countered that the survey was constitutional
because it did not exceed the legitimate purpose of the census, nor would the questionnaire
results be used for any other purpose than statistical compilations. 213 In addition, the ministry
argued that the right to freely develop one’s personality was not injured where the state
interest outweighed the individual’s interest in not having his privacy disturbed. 214 In this
case, the ministry argued, the questions regarding vacation and relaxation were of particular
interest to the state, while the invasion of privacy in the individual’s intimate sphere was
minimal. 215 According, the ministry argued the surveys were constitutional. 216
The Federal Constitutional Court ruled that the federal survey did not violate human
dignity and was not unconstitutional.217 However, the Court recognized that human dignity
would be offended if the individual were transformed into a “mere object” of the state. 218 It
would be unconstitutional for the state to assert the right to catalogue and register every aspect
of an individual’s private life, even if that data was used only in the context of anonymous
statistics. 219 The Court noted that in order for the individual to freely develop his personality,
he must be given an inner space in which he is in full possession of himself, to which he can
211 BVerfGE 27, 1 (3).
212 Id.
213 Id. at 4.
214 Id.
215 Id.
216 Id.
217 Id. at 6.
218 Id.
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withdraw, and to which the outer world has no access so that he can be let alone to enjoy his
right to solitude. 220
Nonetheless, the Court emphasized that not every statistical collection of personal data
violated human dignity. 221 As a member of society, an individual citizen had to accept the
necessity of collecting statistics under certain circumstances, such as in a census that assisted
government in policy planning.222 Determinative was whether the data collected by the state
by its very nature had a secret character. 223 Where the statistical collection only measured
general behavior of an individual that was related to the outside world, personality rights were
not violated at the core of private being, so long as this data was maintained anonymously.224
The Court ruled that the case at hand did not deal with information that had by its
nature a secret character. 225 Although the census questionnaire did impact an area of private
life, it neither forced the respondent to reveal aspects of his intimate sphere, nor did it provide
the state with information that was not otherwise available in the public domain. 226
Information about vacation destinations, the length of vacation, accommodations and
transportation could be obtained through (though admittedly more difficult) other means. 227
In addition the anonymity of the information had been guaranteed, and there was no danger
that the data would be misused for unforeseen purposes. 228 As a result, the Bavarian citizens’
constitutional rights were not violated. 229
ii. The Lebach Case (1973)
In 1973 the Federal Constitutional Court had to decide whether the personality rights
of a convicted criminal should supersede the general interest of the public good. The suspect
219 Id.
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had been involved in the notorious "soldier murders of Lebach," whereby four German
soldiers were killed during a burglary of an ammunition dump in 1969.230 The two primary
perpetrators were friends with the complainant and the relationship had a homosexual
component.231 During the planning of the attack, the complainant repeatedly had expressed
reluctance in carrying out the deed, and he did not take part in the attack. 232 The two primary
perpetrators were convicted in 1970 and received life sentences, whereas the claimant
received a sentence of six years for aiding and abetting the crime.233
In 1972 the state-owned German television channel ZDF planned to broadcast a
television drama about the Lebach murders. In an introduction to the drama, broadcasters
planned to display the names and pictures of those involved in the crime. Additionally, ZDF
planned to air a docu-drama in which actors would reconstruct the crime. The claimant
wanted to prevent the airing of the docu-drama insofar as he (or his name) would be
represented in it. 234
The Federal Constitutional Court had to decide which of two constitutional values
would take priority: the freedom of the media under Article 5 of the Basic Law or the
personality rights of the convicted criminal under Article 2. The Court ruled that the
complainant’s constitutional rights deserved priority because the right to freely develop one’s
personality and protect one’s dignity guarantees every individual an autonomous space in
which to develop and protect his individualism.235 The Court noted that everyone should
determine independently and for themselves whether and to what extent his life and image
can be publicized.236 The Court noted, however, that not the entire area of private life fell
under the protection of personality rights.237 Where, as a member of society at large, an
individual enters into communications with others or impacts them through his presence or
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behavior and therefore impacts the private sphere of others, he limits the privacy of his own
life.238 Where such social interactions are present, the state may take certain measures to
protect the public good. 239
The Court emphasized that in most cases freedom of information would receive
constitutional priority over the personality rights of a convicted criminal.240 However, the
Court found that the encroachment on the convicted criminal’s personality rights should not
go any further than required to satisfy what was necessary to serve the public interest, and
moreover, the disadvantages for the convicted criminal should be weighed against the severity
of the crime committed.241 Using these criteria, the Court found that the planned ZDF
broadcast violated the complainant’s personality rights because of the way in which it named,
pictured and represented him.242
The Court noted that the broadcast represented the complainant, who was recognizable
through the facts of the story even though his name and face were not shown, in a negative
and unsympathetic manner.243 Additionally, the complainant was represented as a primary
perpetrator when in actuality he aided and abetted the crime.244 Moreover, the documentary
put more emphasis on the homosexual element of the relationships between the perpetrators
than the results of the trial warranted.245 The Court also found it relevant that as a general rule
television had a much stronger impact on privacy than a written or verbal report in a
newspaper or radio show.246 Finally, it was important that the ZDF broadcast did not add
anything important or new to the plaintiff’s story.247
Applying these criteria, the Court found that the ZDF report could prevent the
resocialization of the plaintiff in violation of his rights under Articles 1 and 2(1) of the Basic
Law. The inviolability of human dignity required that an ex-convict receive the opportunity
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to re-enter society once he has served his prison term and paid his dues to society.248 The
convicted criminal’s resocialization was put at risk where a television broadcast was to
reenact the crimes of a perpetrator near or after the time of his release from prison.249
Moreover, ZDF’s stated goal of informing the public about the effectiveness of the
prosecution and the security measures taken by the German military since the attacks could be
reached without identifying the complainant in the manner planned.250
iii. The Census Act Case (1983)
Ten years later the Federal Constitutional Court had to evaluate the constitutionality
of another government census. In the Census Act Case of 1983 the Court recognized for the
first time a right to informational self-determination that flowed from the general right to
personality and human dignity under Articles 1 and 2(1) of the Basic Law.251 The decision is
a milestone in German privacy and data protection law.
The case addressed the constitutionality of the federal census required under a 1983
law.252 The goal of the census was to collect information for regional planning and compare
that data to the data in community registers.253 The goal of the census was not a mere head
count. Rather, it sought to collect data related to job titles, employers and residences.254 In
addition, the Federal Census Act permitted the sharing of federal data with local and state
agencies.
The Federal Constitutional Court distinguished its analysis of the Federal Census Act
of 1983 from the law in the Microcensus Case in 1979 because of the fundamental technical
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changes that had taken place in data collection and processing in 14 years.255 Targeted
information could be obtained with less effort, and smaller invasions of privacy could lead to
more specific results.256 State agencies in charge of statistical analyses had created
comprehensive databases.257 At the community level, community registries had turned into
comprehensive resident databases, from which any state agency could draw upon.258 In
addition, the Court expressed concern over the fact that recipients of the census data had
access to other databases, which combined with the census information, could lead to the
formation of a complete and detailed picture of the lives of individual residents – a so-called
“personality profile” that could include even the protected intimate sphere.259 Individual
citizens ran the risk that they could become transparent “persons of glass.”260
In its decision the Federal Constitutional Court declared that the general personality
right under Article 2(1) in connection with Article 1(1) protected individuals against the
collection, storage, use, and dissemination of personal data.261 These constitutional provisions
protected the fundamental right of the individual to control the use of personal information,262
and only the overwhelming public interest could limit this right of informational self-
determination.263 In reaching its decision, the Court emphasized that a person who could not
oversee what information about himself was available in certain social spheres could be
limited in his freedom to plan or make life decisions.264
The Court held that the legislature had a duty to comply with principles of
proportionality in passing laws affecting personal data collection,265 and that organizational
and procedural measure to prevent encroachment on personality rights had to be put in
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place.266 The Court, however, distinguished between two types of data collection: data that
was individualized, non-anonymous and had to be processed and data that was intended for
statistical purposes only.267 The latter type of data collection did not need to be linked to a
specific purpose,268 but had to be subject to certain limitations within the information
system.269
Because the principles of specificity and proportionality were upheld in the data
collection resulting from the 1983 Federal Census Act, the Federal Constitutional Court ruled
that the statute did not violate human dignity. The census did not lead to an unconstitutional
cataloguing or registration of human personality.270 However, the anticipated data-sharing
rules by which state and local agencies could compare information violated the personality
right because they were unsuited to the statute’s goal, and their breadth was
incomprehensible to the ordinary citizen.271 It was not foreseeable for persons affected that
that their statistical information would be passed on to state agencies and other public
authorities.272 Accordingly, the Court held that data could only be passed on for research
purposes273 because a researcher generally was not interested in the person as an individual
but rather as a carrier of specific traits.274 Moreover, a researcher would not be able to
combine such data with information from other government databases.275
C. Recent German Case Law
In the past ten years, German privacy law evolved rapidly as new investigative
measures and technologies became increasingly popular with police and federal investigators.
The Federal Census Case has proven to be particularly influential and has served as the
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foundation of German privacy law in several constitutional cases in the past decade. Most
recently, the Federal Constitutional Court has had to determine whether wiretapping, acoustic
surveillance of the home, and use of GPS surveillance were constitutional under the Basic
Law.
i. Strategic Telegram Surveillance (1999)
In 1999 the Federal Constitutional Court had to decide for the first time whether the
state, specifically the Bundesnachrichtendienst [“BND” or federal intelligence agency], could
surveil international telephone and telefax communications without establishing probable
cause. This so-called "strategic telegram surveillance" was made possible through a 1994
federal crime prevention statute. The law empowered the BND to surveil all non-wired
international telecommunications.
The 1994 law amended a pre-existing statute that had allowed the BND to undertake
similar telecommunications surveillance for strategic intelligence-gathering purposes to
recognize and prevent armed attacks on the Federal Republic of Germany.276 Following an
earlier decision of the Federal Constitutional Court, the BND had only been allowed to surveil
telecommunications to prevent foreign threats, not to prevent threats to domestic security.277
The BND would surveil batches of phone conversations and use search terms to obtain
information that could lead to a general understanding of the situation in a particular country
or region.278 When specific terms or area codes cropped up, the BND would collect the data
associated with these. However, the agency was not allowed to make note of individual
phone numbers or callers and the information had to remain anonymous. In addition, the
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BND had to follow a so-called “no disadvantage” rule which mandated that collected data
could not be used to the disadvantage of an individual (e.g., in a criminal proceeding).279
The 1994 amendment broadened the power of the BND to surveil non-wired
international telecommunications without probable cause to investigate serious crimes, 280
such as arms and drug trade, counterfeiting, money laundering, and terrorism,281 if they could
be connected to a risk of attack on Germany.282 Additionally, the legislature abandoned the
"no disadvantage" rule that had previously protected individuals from the misuse of their
private information.283 The amended law also permitted the BND to use any data collected in
the surveillance to prevent or prosecute any of the above-described crimes and to share the
information with a number of government agencies, including the customs office, government
prosecutors, and police authorities, insofar as it was necessary for them to fulfill their duties.284
The complainants in the constitutional case were several individuals who used means
of international communications for professional reasons. One complainant was a university
professor researching narcotics law who frequently placed telephone calls and sent and
received faxes to and from abroad.285 Additionally, several journalists and one newspaper
publisher who regularly phoned or faxed abroad as part of their reporting duties filed
complaints.286
The complainants claimed that the law itself, as well as the surveillance of their
communications, violated their Basic Rights under Article 10 and Article 1 in conjunction
with Article 2(1).287 The complainants found particularly troublesome the fact that the
collection of their data was taking place without any showing of probable cause288 and that the
mere use of a search term could trigger surveillance.289
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The Federal Constitutional Court in large part approved the 1994 law, but held a few
provisions of the statute unconstitutional.290 The Court emphasized that the surveillance of
international telecommunications indeed was a large encroachment on the right of secrecy of
telecommunications under Article 10 of the Basic Law. However, the Court noted that
limitations on this right were permissible to protect highly valued public interests if the
purposes of the encroachment were precisely defined and the dissemination of the data
collected was limited.291 But the 1994 law did not meet these criteria fully. The Court found
that the BND could continue its surveillance without probable cause, but the dissemination of
collected data had to be limited, the notification of the individual affected improved, and the
parliamentary oversight improved.292
In its decision, the Court relied explicitly on its Census Act decision of 1993 and
applied the reasoning of that case to the special guarantees of the Basic Law’s Article 10.293
The Court stated that the free communication that Article 10 guaranteed would suffer if
individuals feared that the state could use the circumstances or contents of a communication
abroad against the participant in a different context.294 Accordingly, the Court found that the
protection of Article 10 extended not just to the communications themselves, but to the data
processing measures to which the communications were subject.295 Because the dissemination
of the strategically collected data leads to an increase in the number of people who know and
can make use of the communications collected, the Court mandated that better safeguards in
regard to dissemination be put in place.296 Agencies should not have access to the full
database of "strategically" obtained information,297 and the data that is passed on should be
labeled as such. 298
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The Court held that individuals who have been surveilled must be informed in the
aftermath of the surveillance.299 This was the only way to ensure that such individuals could
defend their interests and turn to the courts if necessary.300 The destruction of strategically
collected data should only be allowed after the individual affected by the data has consented.301
If the individual did not consent to destruction, then his or her data should be handed over to
the individual.302 The Court found that the current rule requiring no notification where data
was destroyed within three months was insufficient303 because the mere running of time could
not ensure that the collected data was not misused during that period.304 An exception to the
notification requirement was permissible only in very limited circumstances, e.g., if
notification would endanger an ongoing investigation.305 Finally, the Court held that the
parliamentary oversight needed to be strengthened. The legislature had to be able to oversee
the entire data collection and evaluation process. The Court noted that the individual’s ability
to take legal action could not depend solely only on the fact that he was notified of the
surveillance.306
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ii. The “Large Eavesdropping Attack” Case (2004)
In 1998, the German parliament revised Article 13 of the Basic Law to permit the use
of electronic surveillance to monitor private homes. The legislation was part of a larger
attempt to fight organized crime, whose rapid growth in the 1990s due to an influx of
sophisticated crime groups from the former Soviet Bloc countries had alarmed German
politicians.307 The law was controversial from the outset, with supporters describing it as a
necessary tool in the fight against organized crime and detractors calling it an attack on civil
liberties.308 The debate was complicated by the fact that amendments to the Basic Law
require a 2/3 majority in both chambers of parliament, the Bundestag and the Bundesrat.309
Nonetheless, after seven years of controversy and thorny debate, the Gesetz zur Bekämpfung
des illegalen Rauschgifthandels und anderer Erscheinungsformen der Organisierten
Kriminalität [Law to Fight Illegal Drug Trafficking and Other Manifestations of Organized
Crime] became law by the narrowest of margins. The so-called “Großer Lauschangriff”
[“large eavesdropping attack”] passed in the Bundestag by four votes and by one vote in the
Bundesrat.310
The new law permitted police authorities to listen and record private speech on
private premises under certain conditions without the knowledge of the targeted person.311
Well-founded evidence facts had to indicate that the target had committed one or more of a
series of enumerated high crimes, such as murder, treason, or money laundering.312
Moreover, alternate means of establishing the facts or determining the perpetrator's
whereabouts had to be disproportionately more difficult or offer no prospects of success.313
Acoustic surveillance could take place at the accused’s home or on another person’s premises
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if applying the measure on the accused's premises alone would not enable investigators to
establish the perpetrator’s whereabouts or other sought-after facts sufficiently and if other
means of establishing the facts or determining the accused’s whereabouts would be
disproportionately more difficult or offered no prospects of success.314 Finally, the measures
could be implemented even if they unavoidably involved third persons.315
On March 3, 2004, the Federal Constitutional Court declared significant portions of
the law unconstitutional.316 Specifically, the Court found that certain provisions of the
surveillance laws infringed upon the guarantees of human dignity and the inviolability of the
home under Articles 1 and 13 of the Basic Law. In its ruling, the Court emphasized the
interrelationship between human dignity, the right to personality, and the inviolability of the
home, noting that all citizens were entitled to a sphere of intimacy in which to conduct
private conversations without fear of government intrusion.317 The Court described the
home as “last refuge” for the development of one’s personality and preservation of one’s
dignity — the place where one’s innermost perceptions, thoughts, and opinions emerge.318
The Court noted that persons may be able to forego writing letters or making telephone calls
to preserve their privacy, but asserted that the right to retreat into one’s home was
absolute.319 Because acoustic surveillance of the home implicated privacy rights so
fundamentally, the Court framed the question not as whether evidence gathered through
such means should be admissible in court, but whether such an investigative measure should
be permitted at all.320
In its inquiry, the Court found that particularly intimate types of communications
should be constitutionally safeguarded in all but exceptional cases. The Court created a
protected category of communications that included conversations between close family
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members or other persons of trust, such as members of the clergy, physicians, and criminal
defense attorneys.321 Under the Court’s decision, government officials may monitor these
conversations only if concrete evidence exists at the time an eavesdropping warrant is issued
that at least one of the persons speaking is or was involved in a criminal offense.322
Moreover, the government must show that the crime was particularly serious323 and that there
is strong reason to believe that the content of conversation will not be of the protected type
described above.324 Finally, acoustic surveillance of a private residence may take place only
if and so long as the person being monitored is on the premises.325
Thus, government surveillance of private conversations is permissible so long it is
unlikely to touch on the absolutely protected private sphere. But conversations about the
commission of past, present, or future crimes are not protected.326 If government surveillance
unexpectedly touches upon absolutely protected personal information, it must be halted
immediately.327 Any recordings made must be destroyed, and data collected cannot be used
in criminal prosecutions.328
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iii. The Global Positioning System Case (2005)
The Constitutional Court gave the German legislature until June 2005 to amend the
law to comply with the court's “Large Eavesdropping Attack” decision.329 But before the
legislature had a chance to respond, a second case involving the 1992 law against organized
crime330 came before the Court. This time, the Constitutional Court considered the question
of whether government investigators could use global positioning system (GPS) technology in
investigations and whether such measures conflicted with Articles 1 and 2 of the Basic Law.
In addition to permitting the acoustic surveillance of homes, the 1992 law had
expanded the types of investigative measures law enforcement officials could undertake. One
provision of the new law,331 which was integrated into the Code of Criminal Procedure as §
100c StPO, permitted the taking of photographs and visual recordings without the knowledge
of the person that was the subject of the surveillance.332 In addition, the provision permitted,
under certain conditions, the use of “other special technical measures” for the purposes of
surveillance to establish the facts of a case or to determine the whereabouts of a perpetrator.333
Such measures were permissible where the investigation concerned a criminal offense of
considerable importance, and other means of establishing the facts or determining the
perpetrator's whereabouts were considerably less promising or more difficult.334
An amendment to the law that came into effect on November 1, 2000 further expanded
the investigative powers of the police by allowing for long-term surveillance of suspects.335
Under § 163f StPO, in investigations concerning a criminal offense of considerable
importance, the surveillance of suspects was allowed take longer than twenty-four hours and
could take place on more than two days so long as other means of establishing the facts or
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determining the perpetrator's whereabouts would be considerably less promising or would be
more difficult.336 Such surveillance had to be approved by a criminal prosecutor.337 For
surveillance periods of longer than one month, an order had to be obtained from a judge.338
In the Verfassungsbeschwerde [constitutional complaint] that led to the Court’s April
12, 2005 decision, the claimant, Bernhard Falk, argued that the use of GPS by police
investigators violated his rights under Articles 1(1) and 2(1) of the Basic Law.339 Falk, a
member of the left extremist group Antimperialistische Zelle [Antimperialist Cell] who has
since converted to Islam and now uses the surname Uzun, had been investigated for his use of
explosives against German political parties in furtherance of his political cause as early as
1985. In 1999, he was convicted on four counts of attempted murder and was convicted to
thirteen years in prison.340 Criminal proceedings took place before the Oberlandsgericht
(OLG – Highest Regional Criminal Court) in Düsseldorf, and the court depended heavily on
surveillance evidence collected by police investigators in convicting Falk.341
In addition to traditional observation methods that included video, telephone, and mail
surveillance, police investigators placed a GPS receiver on the claimant’s car. Through a
system of satellite signals and computers, GPS technology can be used to determine the
latitude and longitude of a receiver on Earth. Using this technology, police investigators were
able to pinpoint the location of the claimant’s vehicle within a 50-meter radius for a period of
approximately 10 weeks. The claimant alleged that the use of GPS surveillance violated his
fundamental right to privacy and exceeded the legal boundaries set by § 100c StPO 1(1b). In
addition, Falk claimed that the use of GPS, coupled with the other observation methods,
cumulatively constituted an unconstitutional invasion of his privacy.
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In its April 12, 2005 opinion, the Federal Constitutional Court agreed that the use of
GPS technology in police investigations of crimes of considerable importance was not
unconstitutional.342 Although the Court noted that GPS surveillance did constitute an attack
on the suspect’s personality rights, the extent and intensity of the invasion was not at a level
that violated human dignity or the untouchable core sphere of privacy.343 The Court
emphasized the usefulness of GPS technology was limited to revealing a person’s location
and the length of time spent in a given location, and that GPS did not function effectively in
closed rooms or on streets in dense neighborhoods.344
In rendering its decision, however, the Court asserted that the rapid development of
information technologies demanded that legislators be alert to the creation of new
investigative measures that could infringe upon the constitutional right to informational self-
determination.345 Accordingly, the Court required lawmakers to be prepared to step in with
corrective legislation as necessary to limit the scope of § 100c StPO should the term “other
special technical measures” evolve to include technologies that overreach constitutional
privacy bounds.346
Notably, the Court found that a Rundumüberwachung, or total surveillance (i.e.,
multiple simultaneous observations), leading to the construction of a personality profile of a
suspect, would be constitutionally impermissible.347 Nonetheless, the Court did not find that
the comprehensive surveillance of Falk rose to the level of a Rundumüberwachung even
though police periodically read the suspect’s mail, tapped the suspect’s phone lines, and
observed his home via video.348 The Court noted that the additional surveillance measures,
which were used primarily on the weekends, merely supplemented the GPS surveillance.349
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Moreover, the Court noted that the use of what it considered to be particularly sensitive
acoustic surveillance had been very limited. 350
As a preventative measure, the Court mandated that prosecutors be the primary
decision makers regarding all investigative matters in a case and that prosecutors be informed
of all investigative tools in use.351 The Court noted that a full documentation of all completed
or possible investigative measures must be recorded in the suspect’s file.352 Moreover, in
order to prevent parallel surveillances of the same suspect, prosecutors from different Länder
[federal states] should coordinate their investigative efforts through the Verfahrenregister
[prosecutorial procedure register].353 Similar coordination should occur between prosecutors
and federal intelligence agencies.354 The Court stated that legislators should be vigilant in
regard to whether such coordination is taking place and, if not, create regulations that would
prevent uncoordinated investigative measures.355
iv. Preventative Telecommunications Surveillance (2005)
In 2005 the Federal Constitutional Court also had to decide whether a law in the state
of Lower Saxony that permitted “preventative” telephone surveillance was constitutional.
The law, which went into effect in 2004, allowed state investigators to surveil the
telecommunications of persons in cases where well-founded facts could support the
assumption that the individual being wiretapped had committed a serious crime and that there
appeared to be no other means to prosecute or prevent the crime.356 The law covered both the
content and connection data of the communication and encompassed telephone calls, faces,
text messages on mobile phones, and emails.357 Companions and contact persons could also
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be surveilled.358 The law limited surveillances to three months, with a possibility for a three-
month extension.359 The target of the surveillance had to be informed of the surveillance
retroactively, although some exceptions were permitted.360
The Federal Constitutional Court upheld the constitutional complaint on several
grounds and voided portions of the law. First, the Court found that the legislature of Lower
Saxony had overstepped its bounds in trying to regulate telecommunications for purposes of
crime prevention.361 Because this was an area in which the federal government had concurrent
jurisdiction and the federal government had made use of its competency, state legislators did
not have the competency to pass the law.362 Moreover, legislators had not followed the
requirements of Article 19’s Zitiergebot which requires that lawmakers name the Basic Right
in a law that limits it.363
Substantively, the Court found that the law also did not comply with the
Bestimmtheitsgebot [definitiveness requirement],364 which requires that a law is clearly stated
so that an individual affected by the law can adjust his behavior according to its
consequences.365 The Court noted that an individual should generally be aware under what
conditions and circumstances he may be the subject of a surveillance.366
Additionally, the law was not precise enough in distinguishing between potentially
harmless and criminal behavior.367 The statute permitted the surveillance of an individual
where the facts supported that the individual was about to commit a serious crime. 368 But the
law failed to list any criteria that the police could use to distinguish harmless behavior from
criminal preparation.369 An assumption, even one based on facts, was not sufficient.370
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The Court also found that the constitutional principle of proportionality was not
followed in the Lower Saxony statute. The Court emphasized that the state cannot set limits
on protected freedoms unless the means by which it does so are proportional to the goals of
the law.371 The Court noted that the limitations on the freedom of communications set forth
in the statute were severe.372 The collection of the data proscribed would reveal
communication behavior, as well as the social contacts and personal habits of a targeted
individual.373 Such an extreme encroachment on privacy could be justified only where the
public interest was of overwhelming importance. 374 But the law made no mention of such an
interest. In addition, the law had the potential of impacting the privacy rights not only of the
prospective perpetrator, but of anyone with whom the perpetrator communicated.375 The
encroachment was further intensified by the possibility that government agencies could use
the data for other or more general crime-fighting purposes.376 The Court found that this his
possibility alone qualified as its own encroachment.377
The Court also found that the statute violated Article 10. As a general matter, the state
should not have the possibility to inform itself of the contents of verbal or written
communications.378 Article 10 protected not just the contents of communications, but when,
how, and how frequently and between what persons communications take place.379 The free
communication protected by Article 10 would suffer if the state evaluated such matters.380
Applying its reasoning in the “large eavesdropping attack” case, the Court found that the core
sphere of private life deserved strong protection in regard to telephone wiretaps.381 The Court
held that Article 10 protects the free development of personality by providing a private
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exchange of communications that also preserves human dignity.382 Although the Court noted
that this protection was not as strong as that of the home,383 it held that a well-founded basis
that a suspected perpetrator was about commit a serious crime was necessary to justify the
privacy invasion permitted by the Lower Saxony law.384 Additionally, the surveillance of a
telephone conversation had to be stopped where highly private topics are broached.385 The
results of such measures could not be evaluated and had to be deleted if accidentally seized.386
Such precautions were not in place with the Lower Saxony law.
D. Summary
Like the U.S. Supreme Court, Germany’s highest court has ruled that the home
deserves the highest privacy protection in all but the most extreme cases. The type of
information obtained in state investigations has also proved important. The Federal
Constitutional Court has found the processing and dissemination of information through new
technology particularly dangerous because it could lead to the construction of a “personality
profile.” Unlike that of the U.S. Supreme Court, the analysis of the Federal Constitutional
Court has not focused very heavily on the nature of technology used, though it has
recognized that developments in investigative techniques have given rise to new privacy
concerns.
382 Id. at para. 62.
383 Id.
384 Id. at para. 61.
385 Id. at para. 64.
386 Id.
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III. Comparing Germany and the United States: Human Dignity as the Final
Safeguard of Individual Privacy
In a post-Katz world, three overriding factors appear essential to the American
question of whether a state actor has overstepped Fourth Amendment boundaries. First and
foremost, what is the target of government surveillance? Private residences plainly receive
more protection than commercial property. Second, what type of information does the
surveillance reveal? If the surveillance discloses intimate or otherwise personal details, then
it likely has interfered with an expectation of privacy that society is willing to recognize.
Third, what is the nature of the surveillance technology used? Technologies that are widely
known and broadly used give rise to lower expectations of privacy than those that are
unknown or inaccessible to the public at large.
Similarly, Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court has held that private residences
shall receive the highest privacy protection under all but exceptional circumstances. The
Constitutional Court has also considered what type of information is revealed in police
surveillance. Conversations between family members, or with doctors and attorneys have
been deemed particularly intimate and plainly receive greater protection than other types of
communications. The Court has been less troubled about whether use of the technology is
widely accepted, though it has certainly expressed concern over the increasing invasiveness of
new investigative measures. Finally, the Court has viewed as particularly problematic the
technological processing and distribution of data by government agencies because of the risk
that such actions could lead to the construction of a “personality profile.”
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A. The Sanctity of the Home
In U.S. jurisprudence the home receives the highest privacy protection. Historically,
the Fourth Amendment was enacted precisely to prevent state intrusions in the home under
almost all circumstances. The importance placed on the sanctity of the home by U.S. courts
has not diminished despite the evolution of new investigative technologies.
The preservation of the sanctity of the home was essential to the U.S. Supreme Court’s
holding in Kyllo. There, the Court noted that “any physical invasion of the structure of the
home, by even a fraction of an inch, is too much”387 and emphasized that “the Fourth
Amendment draws a firm line at the entrance to the house.”388 Similarly, the key difference
between the Court’s holdings in Knots and Karo was that in the latter case, the police beeper
was used to trace movements within the defendant’s home.389 The Court stated that “private
residences are places in which the individual normally expects privacy… and that expectation
is plainly one that society is prepared to recognize as justifiable.”390 Conversely, the fact that
the target of surveillance in Dow Chemical was commercial property and “not an area
immediately adjacent to a private home” was dispositive to the Court’s finding that no Fourth
Amendment violation had taken place in that case.391
Like the United States, German jurisprudence has placed strong emphasis on the
absolute impenetrability of the home. In fact, the inviolability of the home is a basic right
articulated in the country’s Basic Law. This goes further than the protection offered by U.S.
Constitution’s Fourth Amendment, which merely protects against unlawful searches and
seizures. In the “Large Eavesdropping Attack” Case, Germany’s Constitutional Court made
plain that the home was an area that warranted almost absolute protection, describing it as the
387 533 U.S. at 37 (emphasis added.)
388 533 U.S. at 40 (emphasis added.)
389 468 U.S. at 714.
390 Id.
391 476 U.S. at 237 n. 4.
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“last refuge” for the development of one’s personality and preservation of one’s dignity.392
The Court also noted that the ability to retreat into one’s home was not a right an individual
could readily give up.393
A comparison between the decisions in the GPS and Preventative Telecommunications
Surveillance Cases make plain the importance the Federal Constitutional Court has placed on
privacy in the home. In the GPS Case the Court emphasized the limits of GPS technology,
noting that its utility in closed rooms or narrow alleyways was virtually non-existent. 394
Therefore, GPS technology could not be used to invade the home. Similarly, the Federal
Constitutional Court noted in the Preventative Telecommunications Surveillance Case that
communications did not deserve as much privacy protection as behaviors in the privacy of
one’s home. 395 The court has pointed out that the inviolability of the home is closely linked to
the preservation of human dignity, which should guarantee “absolute protection” for
behaviors in the home in so far as it represents an individual’s manifestation of his or her
personality. 396
B. Intimacy of Details and Relationships
The U.S. Supreme Court has insisted that the intimacy of the details revealed cannot
on its own determine whether society would be willing to recognize an expectation of privacy
as reasonable.397 In Kyllo, the Court emphasized that “the Fourth Amendment's protection of
the home has never been tied to measurement of the quality or quantity of information
obtained.”398 The problem with such an approach, the Court explained, was that it would
require “a jurisprudence specifying which home activities are ‘intimate’ and which are
not.”399 Specifically, “no police officer would be able to know in advance whether his
392 1 BvR 2378/98 (2004), at para. 20.
393 Id. at para. 54.
394 2 BvR 581/01 (2005), at para. 53.
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through-the-wall surveillance pick[ed] up ‘intimate’ details — and thus would be unable to
know in advance whether [his action was] constitutional.”400 In order to avoid such
complications, the Court has concluded that where a private residence is involved, “all details
are intimate details.”401
Where, however, the area outside of a home is the subject of government surveillance,
the U.S. Supreme Court has focused on the level of intimacy associated with the space
surveyed. In Riley, the Court found that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred because
“no intimate details connected with the use of the home or curtilage were observed.”402 In
Dow Chemical, the fact that the details observed remained limited to an outline of the
facility's buildings and equipment was important.403 But where the home’s curtilage is the
target of surveillance, the Court has said it will inquire “whether the area in question harbors
those intimate activities associated with domestic life and the privacies of the home.”404
The intimacy of details revealed as a result of government action has been at the heart
of Germany’s privacy cases, including those involving criminal defendants. The judicially
recognized sphere theory, which associates different areas of life with different levels of
privacy, provides that the innermost sphere – the intimate sphere – is inviolable.405 In contrast,
a violation of the next sphere – the private sphere – is permissible in the overwhelming
interest of public good so long as strict principles of proportionality are adhered to.406 The
Court has found that the outer sphere – the social sphere – may be invaded, so long as such an
invasion is sanctioned by law. 407
As far back as the Lebach case the Federal Constitutional Court recognized that certain
areas of private life should be protected from state invasion.408 In Lebach, the Federal
400 Id.
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402 488 U.S. at 452.
403 476 U.S. at 238.
404 U.S. v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 n. 4 (1987).
405 Mangoldt/Klein, Art. 2 I Rn. 88; Glaeser, Rn. 35.
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Constitutional Court held that a television report that revealed a convicted criminal’s name
and face did not touch the most intimate sphere of private life, but violated the criminal’s
general personality rights.409 Nonetheless, the court ruled that the reporting of these details
could not be justified by the public’s right to freedom of information. 410
As early as the Microcensus Case, the Federal Constitutional Court reasoned that
general information about an individual’s recreational trips did not involve “the most intimate
realm” and therefore the Basic Law did not protect such details. 411 In contrast, the Court
found in the Federal Census Act Case that the possibility that government authorities could
construct a “complete personality profile” that detailed an individual’s cumulative activities
violated the right to informational self-determination. 412
In a later criminal case involving acoustic surveillance, the Federal Constitutional
Court noted that particularly intimate types of communications warranted almost absolute
privacy protection. 413 Accordingly, the German court created a protected category of
communications that included conversations between close family members or other persons
of trust, such as members of the clergy, physicians, and criminal defense attorneys. 414 The
Court held that the government could monitor such types of communications only if concrete
evidence existed at the time an eavesdropping warrant was issued that at least one of the
persons speaking is or was involved in a criminal offense.415 In the Preventative
Telecommunications Surveillance Case, the Federal Constitutional Court reiterated this
analysis. The Court found that in order for the core sphere of privacy to remain protected
telephone surveillance had to be limited. 416 The Court explained that telephone conversations
did not warrant as much privacy protection as activities inside the home.417 However, the
409 BVerfGE 35, 202 (226).
410 Id.
411 BVerfGE 27, 1 (8).
412 BVerfGE 65, 1 (17).
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Court held that where very private or intimate matters were discussed on the telephone,
government surveillance must cease. 418
The Federal Constitutional Court distinguished the cases involving acoustic
surveillance in the home and preventative telecommunications surveillance from the use of
GPS technology because there was little likelihood that GPS could reveal intimate details of a
subject’s life. The Court emphasized the usefulness of GPS technology was limited to
revealing a person’s location and the length of time spent in a given location, and that GPS
did not function effectively in closed rooms or on streets in dense neighborhoods. 419
Accordingly, the Court found that although GPS surveillance did constitute an attack on the
suspect’s personality rights, the extent and intensity of the invasion was not at a level that
violated human dignity or the untouchable core sphere of privacy.420
How the courts have defined which details are “intimate” and which are not has been
different in Germany and the United States. Should the numbers dialed from a phone, for
example, be protected in the same manner as the contents of the phone conversation? The
U.S. Supreme Court has determined that no one can reasonably expect that the numbers
dialed from one’s telephone are protected as private because this information is readily
available to the phone company. 421 In contrast, the Federal Constitutional Court has found
that the knowledge of when, how often and between whom telephone conversations take
place deserves some privacy protection.422
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C. Technology
The U.S. Supreme Court also has considered the nature of the investigative technology
itself in order to determine whether an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy has been
violated. Two factors have been particularly relevant. First, how sophisticated is the
surveillance equipment being used? In cases where the equipment reveals details analogous
to those government officers could make through naked observations, the technique was less
likely to require a warrant.
As far back as the Smith case the Supreme Court expressed no reservations regarding
police use of pen registers because they did not reveal any information that was not otherwise
available to the phone companies.423 Similarly, the Court did not object to the use of a 35mm
camera from an altitude of 1,000 feet in Ciraolo424 and expressed only limited concerns
regarding the use of a precision aerial mapping camera from as high as 12,000 feet in Dow
Chemical.425 Additionally, the Court distinguished Karo from Knotts because the police
officers in Knotts used a beeper to ascertain information they theoretically could have
obtained by making visual observations.426 In contrast, state officials in Karo gained
information from the radio transmitter not otherwise available to them.427
Second, the Court has evaluated the ubiquitousness of the investigative equipment
used. In regard to the use of 35mm camera, planes, and helicopters, the Court has assumed a
certain “general knowledge” on the part of the general public. Because private and
commercial flight has, for example, become “routine,” no expectation of privacy can be
assumed in regard to police use of such items.428 However, in regard to more sophisticated
equipment, the Court has raised serious concerns. In Kyllo, the Court emphasized that
423 442 U.S. at 743.
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“where… the technology in question is not in general public use” and reveals information that
could not otherwise be obtained without “physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally protected
area,’” its use is likely to constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.429
In Kyllo as well as Dow Chemical, the Court has indicated that the use of satellite technology
without a warrant would be unconstitutional.430
Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court also has looked at the type of technology
used, but it has focused less on the ubiquitousness of the surveillance measure than on its
effect. Primarily, the Constitutional Court has considered whether (1) the surveillance
measure violates human dignity, and (2) whether a Rundumüberwachung has occurred that
could lead to the dangerous and unconstitutional construction of a complete “personality
profile.” Although the characteristics of a Rundumüberwachung remain loosely defined, the
Constitutional Court indicated that such an analysis is qualitative, rather than quantitative.
The Federal Constitutional Court recognized early on that new advances in
technology would lead to deeper invasions of privacy. In the Lebach case the Court
recognized that a television report that revealed private information by its very nature was
more invasive than a written or verbal news report would be.431 Similarly, in the Federal
Census Act case, the Court would rethink its Microcensus Case reasoning, on the grounds that
data processing and distribution techniques had changed significantly in fourteen years.432
The Court noted that the disclosure of limited information could lead much more easily to the
construction of an unconstitutional personality profile in 1983 than in 1969.433
In the newer German cases addressing privacy rights the Federal Constitutional Court
also recognized that private data could be much more quickly and readily utilized for
illegitimate purposes than before. This reality led the Court to require stricter data
429 533 U.S. at 34 (citing Silverman, 365 U.S. 505, 512).
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distribution measures in the Strategic Telegram Surveillance Case434 and to forbid government
agencies from having full access to each other’s databases. 435 In the Preventative
Telecommunications Surveillance Case the Court emphasized constitutional privacy rights
had become particularly at risk due to the sheer quantity of data that could be obtained as a
result of modern telecommunications.436 In that case, the Court found that the possibility that
collected data could be used for purposes other than those for which they could be collected
represented a violated of Article 10 of the Basic Law.
The Court also found that a particularly severe constitutional invasion of privacy
occurrs where a Rundumüberwachung or total surveillance takes place that would lead to the
construction of a personality profile, as would have been the case in the Federal Census Act
case. In the GPS case the Court ruled that no total surveillance had taken place despite the
fact that investigators had read a suspect’s mail, tapped his phones, and videotaped the outside
of his home.437 The Court found significant the fact that the acoustic surveillance was limited
and that GPS was used only as a supplement to the other surveillance methods.438 Nonetheless
the Court emphasized in cases of heavy surveillance, government agencies should coordinate
their efforts with one another to ensure that no unconstitutional total surveillance takes
place.439
D. National Security and Preventative Measures
Where national security and the prevention of imminent danger are at stake, the U.S.
Supreme Court and Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court have expressed similar views in
regard to state use of surveillance technologies. The U.S. Supreme Court never directly has
had to address the question of under what circumstances government use of technical means
might be constitutionally permissible if used to prevent imminent danger, though the Court
434 BVerfGE 100, 313, at para. 190.
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has set limits in regard to technical surveillance for the protection of national security. The
Federal Constitutional Court has permitted state use of technical surveillance measures under
limited circumstances to prevent imminent danger and protect national security.
According to the Federal Constitutional Court, the use of technical surveillance
measures to prevent imminent danger can be justified only where a concrete danger is present
that a specific crime of significant importance is about to be committed. In the Preventative
Telecommunications Surveillance Case of 2005, the Court explained that a law that permitted
preventative telephone wiretapping only could be viewed as reasonable if it had the goal of
protecting an overriding public interest.440 Additionally, a law permitting such surveillance
would have to define in precise terms which crimes it intended to prevent and what types of
behaviors indicated that such a crime was imminently going to be committed.441
In the “Large Eavesdropping Attack” Case of 2004, the German Court made it plain
that only the protection of life and limb could justify that a suspect was not informed in the
immediate aftermath that he had been the subject of an acoustic surveillance in his home.
Any subject of acoustic surveillance would have to be informed immediately that he had
been the target of an acoustic surveillance at home as soon as the danger to life and limb had
passed and as soon as the investigation no longer could be compromised.442
Unlike the German Federal Constitutional Court, the U.S. Supreme Court has yet to
decide a case in which it must determine how far the state may go in using technical
surveillance measures to prevent imminent danger. It is likely that the Court would apply
similar principles as it has in other cases involving emergency situations and exigent
circumstances. According to those cases, one could make the argument that the use of
technical surveillance measures without a search warrant could be justified where life is
439 BVerfG, 2 BvR 581/01 (2005), at para. 62.
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endangered or where the risk of serious bodily harm is present.443 As soon as the exigent
circumstances or emergency situation that justified the warrantless use of surveillance
measures has passed, an investigator likely would have to apply for a search warrant to
undertake any additional surveillance. 444
In cases where the state has used technical surveillance measures for preventative
purposes, where no danger to life or limb is present, lower U.S. courts have found other
means of justifying the surveillance. The use of metal detectors at airports, for example, has
been justified by the argument that airline passengers implicitly consent to be searched when
they buy a plane ticket.445 Video surveillance in public buildings has been rationalized
because no reasonable expectation of privacy exists in a public space.446 Accordingly, those
scenarios have proved mostly unproblematic.
Where national security is at risk, U.S. and German jurisprudence has evolved
differently despite the fact that courts in both countries have seen similar dangers in such
surveillances. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that state surveillance of political
groups with unpopular political opinions could be abused by the government and thereby
endanger freedom of speech under the First Amendment.447 Similarly, the Federal
Constitutional Court has explained that freedom of telecommunication under Article 10 of
the Basic Law would suffer if the population had to fear that the state could use the contents
of phone calls and other telecommunications to their disadvantage.448
The highest courts in Germany and the United States have resolved this problem
differently, however. The U.S. Supreme Court has distinguished between intelligence-
gathering activities that affect domestic persons and groups and those that only affect foreign
powers of foreign persons and groups. Surveillance of the first category of persons requires a
443 See Bender, supra note 13, at § 3.02.
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search warrant.449 Whether a search warrant is constitutionally required for the second group
remains an open question. In contrast, the Federal Constitutional Court has held that Article
10 of the Basic Law, which guarantees freedom of communications, is implicated when a
conversation is recorded and evaluated on German soil – regardless of the nationality or
location of the person communicating. 450 The German Court has left open the question of
whether such a territorial link is required or whether Article 10 also protects foreign
communications taking place on foreign soil. 451
In both countries legislators have attempted to limit by statute the negative
consequences the surveillance of overseas phone calls or communications with “foreign
powers” can have on the rights of their citizens. In the United States prosecutors must meet
certain conditions to ensure that U.S. persons are not affected too strongly during
surveillances of foreign powers.452 Similarly, German legislators have put safeguards in the
new G-10 security law 453 to ensure that the surveillance of overseas telecommunications is
limited in such a way as to avoid the surveillance of telephone lines used predominantly by
German citizens 454
What is required by each country’s constitution is different. In the Strategic Telegram
Surveillance Case, the Federal Constitutional Court required that the distribution of collected
data remain limited, that notification of surveilled suspects be improved, and that
parliamentary oversight be strengthened.455 The U.S. Congress has addressed similar
concerns in the Wiretap Statute and FISA with similar legal results. But the U.S. Supreme
Court has not mandated these legislatively imposed safeguards as constitutionally required.
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E. Prospects for the Future: When “Reasonable Expectations” Cease to Be
Reasonable
At first glance, it appears that different legal approaches to privacy law in Germany
and the U.S. have yielded final results that do not differ substantially. Despite dissimilar
emphases on the technological nature of the government investigative measures used and the
types of information revealed, both countries’ regimes ultimately recognize the home as the
most protected of private spheres. In both countries, government investigators must meet the
highest constitutional standards to penetrate a private residence.
The approach taken by Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court, however, may be
better equipped to address future privacy concerns arising from continued developments in
investigative technologies because of a key difference that exists between the U.S. and
German privacy regimes. Simply stated, while U.S. law protects merely the expectation of
privacy, German jurisprudence protects privacy itself. In Germany, privacy is a positive right.
By linking privacy to human dignity, Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court has constructed
an affirmative obligation on the part of the state to create the conditions that foster and uphold
the private sphere. In contrast, the right to privacy in the United States is a negative right.
Individuals have the right to be free from illegal government searches and seizures, but the
government has no constitutional duty to preserve or cultivate an individual’s private sphere.
Because Germany’s jurisprudence puts such a high premium on privacy itself, it
should come as no surprise that the Federal Constitutional Court has placed more weight on
the type of information revealed in a government investigation and less emphasis on the
nature of investigative measures used. The sophistication or ubiquitousness of an
investigative measure is simply not relevant if the end result of an investigation is that the
constitutionally protected private sphere has been pierced. In this sense, the German regime
is quite absolutist.
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In contrast, the types of observation measures used in government investigations is
highly relevant in U.S privacy law because it goes to the heart of the question of whether an
individual had a reasonable expectation of privacy that society is willing to recognize.
Technologies that are widely known and broadly used give rise to lower expectations of
privacy than those that are unknown or inaccessible to the public at large. The U.S. approach
is problematic because expectations are by their nature malleable. As technologies become
increasingly “routine,” individuals cannot reasonably expect that the government will not use
such technologies against them. Accordingly, privacy rights are diminished. The existing
case law bears this out. Prior to the invention of airplanes and helicopters, for example, a
fenced-in backyard would have been considered private because no individual could have
reasonably anticipated that someone could see over the edge of a tall barrier.
Under German law, however, the development of new investigative technologies does
not and would not require a shift in privacy standards. Because German law protects the
principle of privacy itself and provides for an affirmative right to informational self-
determination, certain spheres of privacy remain absolutely impenetrable, regardless of the
investigative measure used. Therefore, any government invasion of privacy that offends
human dignity is prohibited in all but the most extraordinary of circumstances. Moreover,
because individuals have the right to control the distribution of information about themselves,
it is irrelevant whether it is data processing software, acoustic surveillance equipment, or
global position technology leads to a breach of privacy. The issue remains whether the
personal information revealed or the profile constructed violates an individual’s human
dignity.
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IV. Conclusion
As government surveillance methods become increasingly sophisticated, the United
States will have to consider a more comprehensive approach to privacy law. A rule based
strictly on the reasonable expectation of privacy is ill equipped to protect individuals against
increasingly invasive police investigative methods made possible through advances in
technology. In contrast, Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court has established a privacy
regime capable of standing the test of time. By linking privacy to human dignity, the Federal
Constitutional Court has assured that privacy lines are not redrawn simply because
investigative technologies get more sophisticated or law enforcement priorities shift.
